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JoSeph d. gaSparro 
 Ravaged by war and in debt after its victory in the French and Indian War, Britain 
was not only recuperating, but rejoicing over the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763.1   This 
treaty officially ended the fighting and gave Britain all of the land east of the Mississippi River, 
formerly owned by the French. The ink on the treaty was barely dry when a new insurgence 
arose in British occupied North America. Native Americans, dissatisfied after the war with their 
position as conquered people and not as allies, rebelled collectively against British colonists and 
forts along the frontier. Before the war had started, the French had traded and lived among the 
Native Americans, but perhaps most importantly, they had given them presents to show respect 
and diplomacy. The Native Americans had grown accustomed to this act of friendliness and when 
Britain, in debt after the war, wanted to considerably reduce the number of gifts given, there 
were severe consequences. In 1763, the Native Americans led an insurgence, commonly called 
Pontiac’s Rebellion because of Pontiac, the Ottawa leader. This insurgence would culminate in 
the first extensive multi-tribal resistance to European colonization in America.2  In response to 
Britain’s new policies, the Native Americans took ten of their forts, which led not only to excess 
in conflict, but to the British exposing smallpox blankets onto the Native Americans.   
 The term ‘frontier’ will take on two meanings in this paper. A frontier in this paper 
will be regarded as an uninhabited region, one that has lacked major exploration and study. 
Because of the absence of examination and official colonization, a frontier will also be viewed 
as “geographic zones of interaction between two or more distinctive cultures.”3  At the time 
of Pontiac’s Rebellion, the British considered the Native Americans as savages and themselves 
civilized, a view echoed by Fredrick Jackson Turner, who felt a frontier was “the meeting place 
between savagery and civilization.”4  The term ‘Native American’ is used frequently throughout 
this paper, and while the word is vague in identifying certain tribes, the frontier was also vague, 
as aspects of it were oftentimes indistinguishable and unclear due to its vastness (see Figure 1). 
1 I would like to thank the Gettysburg College History Department, especially Michael J. Birkner, Scott Hancock, Timothy J. Shannon,  
 and, of course, Barbara A. Sommer. I would furthermore like to thank the Carteret, New Jersey School District, especially Mary Comba and  
 Nicholas G. Sysock. My family and friends are also deserving of my gratitude. 
2 Ian K. Steele, Warpaths (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 234.
3 David J. Weber and Jane M. Rausch, eds., Where Cultures Meet (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1994), xiv.
4 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), 3.
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During any given ambush or attack, numerous tribes would come and go as they saw fit, and 
oftentimes several members of a tribe felt uncomfortable with warfare. Relations between the 
Native Americans and British were also not uniform. There have been many accounts of Native 
Americans warning frontier settlers prior to an attack and even aiding in their actual escape.5 
Similarly, British surgeons stationed at forts often provided medical care for the local Native 
Americans.6  The frontier was a “vast wilderness, interspersed with lakes and mountains,” and 
this not only impeded communication but access to reinforcements as well.7   
              Figure 18 
 In Fredrick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis, published in 1893, he claimed that “[the] 
idealistic conception of vacant lands as an opportunity for a new order of things is unmistakably 
present” and that “never again will such gifts [such as] free land offer themselves.”9  The land 
Turner claimed to be vacant and “free” was actually the home of numerous Native American 
tribes. After the British victory in the French and Indian War, the British struggled to control 
the Native Americans who had already adjusted to French policy, with whom they had lived and 
traded more or less as equals.10   Richard White, who published The Middle Ground, described 
this situation as the “middle ground,” a way of finding a common ground and cooperating.11 
It is very likely that the British could have found a “middle ground” if they had kept the same 
policy as the French, especially in respect to gift gifting, which the Native Americans took 
as a sign of diplomacy. Furthermore, Turner calls North America’s Indian policy “a series of 
experimentations,” and with good reason.12  Britain’s policy towards Native Americans, while 
5 C. Hale Sipe, The Indian Wars of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: Telegraph Press, 1929), 424, 427-428. 
6 Elias Meyer to Henry Bouquet, 24 September 1761, in The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 5, ed. Louis M. Waddell (Harrisburg: The   
 Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1984): 777-780.
7 Wilbur R. Jacobs, Dispossessing the American Indian (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), 87. 
8 Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ed., Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 40-41. 
9 Turner, Frontier, 261.
10 Gregory Evans Dowd, “The French King Wakes up in Detroit: ‘Pontiac’s War’ in Rumor and History,” Ethnohistory 37(1990): 266. The   
 Native Americans were so accustomed to French traditions and way of life that Dowd calls them “Frenchified.” 
11 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, empires, and republics in the Great Lakes region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University   
 Press, 1991), 52. 
12 Turner, Frontier, 10. 
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constructed to help England’s economy, also helped to provoke Pontiac’s Rebellion. Faced with 
Britain’s strict new policy, the Native Americans now struggled to alter their conceptions of 
European colonization and comprehend the policies of the victor. 
 Since Francis Parkman published The Conspiracy of Pontiac in 1851, there have been two 
major arguments on the subject of Pontiac’s Rebellion.  One of the crucial arguments questions 
how much power the Ottawa leader Pontiac truly had. Parkman’s work portrayed Pontiac as the 
primary leader of the tribes and admiringly said his “authority was almost despotic.”13   Parkman 
even called the uprising Pontiac’s own conspiracy. Other historians disputed Parkman’s views 
and considered Pontiac’s authority to be more akin to a local commander than a great chief. 
These historians even renamed the rebellion in order to avoid mentioning his name.14  
 Although debated for decades, Pontiac was indeed the true mastermind behind the 
insurgence. While an initial insurgence plot among the Native Americans failed in 1761, Pontiac 
was a more able leader and used the plans of that spoiled plot as a pattern for his assault upon 
the British forces.15  Years later in 1766, when it came time for peace talk, the British sought 
after Pontiac because they knew no lasting peace was possible without his approval.16  Historians 
also questioned the effect of the infamous smallpox blankets on the Native American uprising. 
Even though both men lack creditable evidence, Parkman, and Francis Jennings in 1988, agreed 
that the blankets had a major impact on the tide of the war.17  Contrastingly, in 2005, David 
Dixon rightfully belittled the consequences with exemplary statistics.18  Although there have been 
numerous publications on Pontiac’s Rebellion, no author has had the viewpoint that the British 
were influenced to distribute the blankets because of the Native American’s victories. Rather, these 
historians conclude that the blankets were distributed either for selfish reasons or out of genuine 
kindness.19  The idea, however, that the fall of the ten forts directly led to the distribution of 
the smallpox blankets has never been explored by historians in the past. Nevertheless, as views 
and sources have emerged and transformed over time concerning Pontiac’s Rebellion, so too 
has the iconographic power of Pontiac and the success of the infamous blankets.  
 While Parkman, in a flattering language, justified Pontiac as the “Indians’ forlorn 
hope” and the only leader of the rebellion, later historians not only added more leaders to the 
insurgence but belittled Pontiac’s stature.20  When C. Hale Sipe published The Indian Wars of 
Pennsylvania in 1929, he had nearly eighty years of scholarly research, of which Parkman never 
had had the chance to use. In this work, Sipe included other Native Americans besides Pontiac 
who helped in the insurgence.21   In 1947, when Howard H. Peckham published Pontiac and the 
13 Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac (New York, 1991), 482.
14 Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven (Baltimore, 2002), 5; and William R. Nester, Haughty Conquerors: Amherst and the Great Indian   
 Uprising of 1763 (Connecticut: Praeger, 2000), ix. 
15 Jacobs, Dispossessing, 86-87. 
16 Parkman, Conspiracy, 482; Thomas Gage to Bouquet, 20 December 1764, Bouquet Papers, 733-734. 
17 Parkman, Conspiracy, 482; Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), 447-448.
18 David Dixon, Never Come to Peace Again (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 152.
19 Knollenberg, Germ Warfare, 493-494; Sipe, Indian Wars, 494; Peckham, Pontiac, 227; Philip Ranlet, “The British, the Indians, and   
 Smallpox: What Actually Happened at Fort Pitt in 1763?,” Pennsylvania History 67(2000), 437.
20 Parkman, Conspiracy, 485. 
21 Sipe, Indian Wars, 412
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Indian Uprising, he was the curator of manuscripts at William L. Clements Library, and learned 
from the Thomas Gage Papers, delivered to him in 1937, that Parkman’s heroic Pontiac was 
but a local commander who “had fought a losing war.”22  Peckham had the pleasure to view the 
papers of Thomas Gage, who succeeded the arrogant Jeffery Amherst as British Commander-
in-Chief of North America in 1763. These papers of Gage were full of “crucial and previously 
inaccessible information on Pontiac and the ill-fated rebellion.”23  Written during the time of 
World War II, Peckham does give Pontiac the credit he is due, but in a much more humble 
light than the prodigious Pontiac of Parkman.24   
 As time went on, historians were motivated not only by other publications, but by 
historical revisionism, or a reexamination of the facts. In 1972, Wilbur R. Jacobs published 
Dispossessing the American Indian, in which he stood behind Parkman and asserted Pontiac as the 
mastermind.25  Jacobs was heavily influenced by Vine Deloria, who in 1969 wrote Custer Died 
for Your Sins: An Indian Manifest, in which Deloria felt Native Americans were being labeled as 
malicious savages. Deloria wanted to break the stereotype and illustrate the atrocious history 
of American expansionism into the west.26  The publications of Richard White’s The Middle 
Ground in 1991 and William R. Nester’s Haughty Conquerors in 2000 established innovative 
views on the story of Pontiac due in part to the historical revisionism that emerged towards 
the end of the twentieth century.27  White follows Peckham’s view that Pontiac was only a local 
commander, but adds that after the uprising was subdued with the signing of a peace treaty, 
Native Americans’ reception of frequent presents resumed again, lands were protected by the 
new proclamation of their British “father,” and the so called ‘middle ground’ was restored.28 
Nester, on the other hand, was motivated by a reexamination of the documented facts and 
blamed Amherst’s supercilious attitude and inability to listen to his British officers about his 
new policy, which concerned the Native Americans’ revolt. Pontiac, Nester asserts, “was but 
one of many chiefs who took up the Seneca war cry” that was provoked by Amherst’s “penny 
wise, pound foolish” gift giving policy to the Native Americans.29     
 Aside from the debate over Pontiac’s power, evidence that suggests the outcome of the 
infamous smallpox blankets at Fort Pitt in 1763 raises much discussion, as well as examination 
of which British officer should take credit for the idea. When Parkman published his renowned 
book in 1897, he cited two letters between Bouquet and Amherst in early July in which they 
discuss dispersing smallpox among the Native Americans.30   The letters, however, were written 
two weeks after Captain Simeon Ecuyer had apparently already given the infected blankets to 
22 Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1947), xvi., 319; and Henry P. Beers, “The   
 Papers of the British Commanders in Chief in North America, 1754-1783,” Military Affairs 13(1949): 87.
23 Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1947), xvi. 
24 Peckham, Pontiac, xvii. 
25 Jacobs, Dispossessing, 88. 
26 Ibid., 1. 
27 Ranlet, Indians and Smallpox, 429.
28 Steele, Warpaths, 246-247; White, Middle Ground, 271. 
29 Nester, Haughty Conquerors, ix. 
30 Parkman, Conspiracy, 648.
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two Native American chiefs. Generals Jeffery Amherst and Henry Bouquet, who were both 
important and well-known British officers, also embodied the same qualities of leadership that 
Parkman admired in Pontiac. Captain Ecuyer, who historians affirm gave the Native Americans 
the blankets, conversely had neither the stature nor the popularity of Amherst or Bouquet.31 
Parkman would thus not credit Ecuyer, merely a captain and subordinate to Bouquet, for the 
distribution of the smallpox blankets.
 Parkman, who died in 1893, asserted that the smallpox from the blankets wreaked 
havoc on the frontier. Although Parkman lacked any statistical data, his theory would last 
among historians until 1954, when Bernhard Knollenberg’s article “General Amherst and Germ 
Warfare” argued the contrary.32  The use of the term ‘germ warfare’ to describe the incident 
at Fort Pitt appeared among a generation which had just witnessed the largest armed conflict 
in world history—the dropping of the atomic bombs. Knollenberg, who, like Peckham, had 
the advantage of using the Thomas Gage Papers, stated that smallpox did impact the Native 
Americans, but it was not from the blankets. With the exception of Francis Jennings’s Empire 
of Fortune in 1988, historians since Knollenberg’s article argue that the blankets did not spread 
smallpox to the surrounding Native American tribes; rather, the tribes became infected by 
smallpox while ravaging villages where the disease was prevalent.33  Before Pontiac or smallpox 
infected blankets even entered into the minds of the British, they were concerned with attaining 
land in the Ohio River Valley over the French. This is where Native American unrest first began 
to form.  
 The French and Indian War began as a struggle for British expansion west of the 
Allegheny Mountains in the Ohio River Valley. Prior to the war, three primary Native American 
tribes lived in the area: the Seneca, the Delaware, and the Shawnee. While their economy was 
self-sufficient and revolved around fishing and hunting, they had no great attachment to the 
French, unlike the tribes of the Great Lakes region: the Ottawa, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and 
Hurons. These nations traded, lived, and intermarried with the French. France’s three newly 
acquired colonies, Canada, the Illinois Country, and Louisiana, were also extremely dependent 
upon these Native Americans because their economic system was based upon a close trade 
relationship. In the late 1740s, both the French and the British laid claim to the land in the 
Ohio River Valley. Even though neither had settlers in the valley yet, the British needed an outlet 
for their booming population and the French wanted to protect their economy and authority 
over the land.34  
31 Sipe, Indian Wars, 424; Peckham, Pontiac, 170; Dixon, Peace Again, 153; and Elizabeth A. Fenn, “Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century   
 North America: Beyond Jeffrey Amherst,” The Journal of American History 86 (2000), 1557; and Bernhard Knollenberg, “General Amherst   
 and Germ Warfare,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41 (1954): 493-494.
32 Knollenberg, Germ Warfare, 493-494; Sipe, Indian Wars, 494; Peckham, Pontiac, 227. 
33 Jennings, Fortune, 448; Dixon, Peace Again, 153; Dowd, War, 190; Ranlet, Indians and Smallpox, 431; White, Middle Ground, 288, Jacobs,  
 Dispossessing, 82; Adrienne Mayor, “The Nessus Shirt in the New World: Smallpox Blankets in History and Legend,” The Journal of   
 American Folklore 108 (1995): 58.
34 William R. Nester, The Great Frontier War: Britain, France, and the Imperial Struggle for North America, 1607-1755 (Westport: Praeger,   
 2000), 1-45; D. Peter MacLeod, “Microbes and Muskets: Smallpox and the Participation of the Amerindian Allies of New France in the   
 Seven Years’ War,” Ethnohistory 39 (1992), 53.
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 There, Ohio River Indians eventually began to trade with the British for provisions 
such as alcohol. This enraged the French, who did not want to lose their economic monopoly. 
Aside from hanging plaques on trees by every major river confluence in order to show claim to 
the land, the French established forts in 1752 under Marquis Duquesne, Governor of Canada, 
“to make every possible effort to drive the English from our lands.”35  While constructing the 
forts, the French were dismayed when they were warned by Native Americans to “not build 
any forts,” and to find out the British eventually set up their own fort a year later.36  When the 
French received word of the building of the British garrison, they sent numerous troops who 
successfully surrendered the fort. A year later, in 1754, the British ordered a then unremarkable 
George Washington to help with the construction of their fort. When Washington realized the 
fort was under French rule, he attacked a French militia a few miles from the fort, and with 
that he “set the world on fire.”37  The French and Indian War had begun.  
 Seven years of conflict and war would follow the Battle of Jumonville Glen, 
Washington’s attack on the French. Although Native Americans sided with the British before 
the war with the exception of the Iroquois Confederacy, once the conflict began they primarily 
fought alongside the French. Once the British began to build trading posts and an eventual 
fort in the Ohio Region, the French not only began to attack British soldiers but their Native 
American allies, made up mostly of the Iroqouis Confederacy. After unsuccessful attempts to 
try to obtain weapons from the British in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Winchester, Virginia 
in order to protect themselves, the Native Americans had no choice but to align themselves 
with the French. Furthermore, the events leading up to the Battle of Jumonville Glen proved 
to be particularly important. From the onset, the French had a more personal relationship with 
the Native Americans, intermarried and even lived among them. Early in the war, in 1758, the 
British signed the Treaty of Easton, stating that they would not settle west of the Allegheny 
Mountains as long as the Ohio Nation did not side with the French.38   While the agreement was 
followed at first by the Native Americans, they eventually disregarded it because their intimacy 
with the French was stronger. 
 The war ended with the Treaty of Paris in February 1763, which gave the British all of 
France’s land east of the Mississippi River. As a result, the French no longer possessed territory 
in North America. With the French driven out, settlers began to move over the Allegheny 
Mountains with the motivation to not only advance, but to profit from the fur trade. Not 
only were the Native Americans angered by the defiance of the Treaty of Easton, but they were 
stunned to discover that the French had lost the war and that they were now under British rule. 
35 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 32. 
36 Nester, Haughty Conquerors, 53-58.
37 William M. Fowler, Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763 (New York: Walker &   
 Company, 2005), 43.
38 Anderson, Crucible of War, 278. The Mingos, from the Ohio Country, unlike the Great Lakes region, had no great attachment to the French.  
 The Mingos made peace with the British in 1758, with the Treaty of Easton, with the understanding that the British would withdraw from   
 the Ohio Country. However, the British strenghtened their forts in the region, and decided not to abandon. This drove the Mingos to uprise  
 in 1763. 
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When the British began to enact new polices for their recently acquired people and land, the 
Native Americans were unwilling to comply with them.   
  Major General Jeffery Amherst, the commanding officer of the British forces in 
North America, had the responsibility of implementing these new policies among the Native 
Americans. Amherst, the ‘hero’ who overtook Montreal in 1760 to close the French and Indian 
War in North America, was not interested in concilitiation with the Native Americans.39  By 
late 1762, Amherst also had to deal with the drastic reduction of Britain’s once powerful army 
due to the deployment of troops to participate in attacks on French and Spanish possessions in 
the Caribbean.40  The remaining troops were spread so thinly around the newly conquered land 
that Amherst found it hard to maintain proper garrisons. Each region had their own distinctive 
way of treating the Native Americans, and this compounded disarray throughout the frontier. 
Although people in the Louisiana territory intermarried with the Native Americans, people in 
the Ohio region did not have any major ties to them. To enforce a universal Native American 
policy also proved to be a problem because Amherst had to consider the differences in each tribe’s 
viewpoint on political and economical issues.41  Amherst had a major challenge before him, 
but whichever policy he employed, he had to consult Sir William Johnson, Native American 
superintendent, which was a challenge in itself. Johnson, aside from being well-known for the 
founding of Johnstown, New York, is also known for his cordial Native American policy. Amherst 
felt Johnson was resistant to change, and oblivious to the economic pressures the crown faced 
because he kept requesting money that Britian simply did not have.42  England was in a debt of 
over a million dollars, and there was no money left to spend on North America. As troops were 
deployed elsewhere, Britain focused its attention on more urgent problems and left Amherst to 
employ his own policies. 
 Amherst’s first experience with Native Americans was when the Cherokees in the 
Carolinas revolted against their former British allies in the summer of 1761.43  The Cherokees 
traded not only deerskins but war captives from other tribes to South Carolina. There was 
an immediate change, however, when Governor William H. Lyttelto imprisoned a group of 
Cherokee chiefs.44  The Cherokees responded by revotling near Charleston, South Carolina. The 
rebellion died down shortly but not before the Native Americans seized one frontier post, killing 
twenty-five soldiers in the garrison.45  Amherst knew the level of destruction the Native Americans 
were capable of and the British were already suspicious of their Iroquois allies who, during the 
French and Indian War, had proven frequent deserters and thieves. In a letter to Pennsylvania 
Governor James Hamilton, Amherst explained how he felt about his allies’ actions:  
39 Anderson, Crucible of War, 407-408
40 Dixon, Peace Again, 74.
41 Ibid., 76. 
42 Colin G. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 69.
43 Dixon, Peace Again, 77. 
44 Anderson, Crucible of War, 460. 
45 Ibid., 466-467.
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If they do not behave as good and faithful allies ought to do, and renounce all acts 
of hostilities against His Majesty’s subjects I shall retaliate upon them, and I have the 
might so to do tenfold every breach of treaty they shall be guilty of and every outrage 
they shall committ.46 
With Amherst’s questioning of his Native American allies, and with the Cherokee conflict still 
fresh in his mind, his first policy initiative was to cut back and deprive Native Americans of 
arms and ammunition. In a letter to Sir William Johnson, Amherst proclaimed “we have it in 
our power to reduce them to reason,” assuming that Native Americans would be less likely to 
revolt without firearms.47  
 In addition to decreasing arms for the Native Americans, Amherst also wanted to reduce 
the distribution of gifts to them as well. Amherst saw little need to supply Native Americans 
with gifts, as the British were conquerors and the Native Americans were subjects. This new view 
abolished Richard White’s ‘middle ground,’ which White argued grew “according to the need 
of people to find a means, other than force, to gain the cooperation or consent of foreigners.”48 
With England’s debt in mind, Amherst thought he was doing the crown a favor by limiting 
gifts, and he verifies this in a letter to Sir William Johnson :
With regards to furnishing the [Indians], with a little cloathing, some arms & 
ammunition to hunt with, that is all very well in cases of necessity; but as, when the 
intended trade is established they will be able to supply themselves with these, from the 
traders, for their furs, I do not see why the Crown should be put to that expense.49  
The foundation of Amherst’s policy was to eliminate presents that served as a token of the entire 
‘middle ground.’50  The French regularly presented gifts to the Native Americans as a sign of 
diplomacy and peace, but Amherst saw gift giving, except in cases of dire need, as a bribe for 
good behavior. While Amherst was justifiable in keeping the needs of Britain as his primary 
objective, White would argue that he ultimately failed because he did not “convince [the Native 
Americans] that some mutual action was fair and legitimate.”51  When the French had a conflict 
with the Native Americans, they would try to “gain an audience” with them and speak with 
kind words, calling them “their children,” in order to work out a mutual agreement, ‘a middle 
ground.’52  The British, on the other hand, ignored the Native American’s opinion of the situation. 
46 Jeffery Amherst to James Hamilton, 30 March 1760, in The Sir William Johnson Papers, Vol. 3, ed. James Sullivan (Albany: The University of  
 the State of New York 1921): 205.
47 Amherst to William Johnson, 11 August 1761, Ibid., 3:517; and Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its   
 People, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 163. 
48 White, The Middle Ground, 52.
49 Amherst to Johnson, 22 February 1761, Johnson Papers, 3: 345. 
50 White, Middle Ground, 257; R. G. Robertson Rotting Face: Smallpox and the American Indian (Caldwell: Caxton Press, 2002), 119. 
51 White, The Middle Ground, 52.
52 Dixon, Peace Again, 18. 
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The French, unlike the British, produced a Métis population from their intermarriage, “bound 
by family, religion, and culture” to both the French and the Native Americans.53  Not only did 
the Native Americans resent the new policy, especially the pro-French Great Lakes region, but 
so did some British, Sir William Johnson among them. 
 Johnson, known by the Mohawks and other members of the League of Five Nations 
as “Warrahhiyagey” or “the man who undertakes great things,” understood Native American 
politics best and greatly opposed Amherst’s new policy.54  Johnson knew Amherst’s new plan 
would bring about severe repercussions. Aside from representing diplomacy, the gifts were a 
tribute to Native American chiefs and payment for allowing the whites to build forts on their 
land.55  As White further described, Johnson tried to make Amherst “understand the world and 
reasoning of others” because not only would Native American chiefs lose power because they 
were not receiving tribute, but their suspicions of British intentions would be increased.56  In a 
letter to Charles Wyndham, the Earl of Egremont and the newly appointed Secretary of State 
for the Southern Department responsible for the American colonies, Johnson wrote:
Your lordship you will observe that the Indians are not only very uneasy, but jealous of 
our growing power, which the enemy [France] (to engage them firmly in their interest) 
had always told them would prove their ruin, as we should by degrees surround them 
on every side, & at length extirpate them. . . . from the treatment they receive from 
us, different from what they have been accustomed to by the French, who spared no 
labor, or expense to gain their friendship and esteem, which along enabled them to 
support the war in these parts.57 
Johnson thought Amherst was naïve regarding the Native Americans’ capacity to wage war, 
and the only way to prevent it was to treat them fairly and to keep them supplied with arms, 
ammunition and, above all, gifts.  Amherst, conversely, believed he had the power to demand 
‘good behavior’ of Native Americans, rather than gifts, because he was the conqueror. Still, 
Johnson argued that the expense of presents would greatly outweigh the cost of fighting a war 
which the natives will not stop “until they have spread havoc over all the frontiers.”58  Except for 
the elimination of presents and gunpowder to the Native Americans, Johnson did not “seriously 
question British measures; [he] only criticized the speed with which they were taken and the 
failure to negotiate them according to the diplomatic procedures of the middle ground.”59 
53 Ibid., 71; Jennings, Fortune, 441; Dowd, War, 26-27.
54 Dowd, War, 72-73.
55 White, Middle Ground, 52
56 Ibid. 
57 Johnson to Charles Wyndham, Earl of Egremont, 31 May 1762, in The Sir William Johnson Papers, ed. James Sullivan (Albany: The   
 University of the State of New York, 1951), 3: 461-462.
58 Ibid. 
59 White, Middle Ground, 259. 
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When Amherst repeatedly ignored Johnson’s warnings, Johnson said Amherst “was not at all 
friend of Indians, which I am afraid may have bad consequences.”60  
 Johnson was not alone in opposing Amherst’s Native American policy. George Croghan, 
Johnson’s deputy Indian agent, also believed that several provisions were cheaper than funding 
a war against the Native Americans: 
The British and French Colonies since the first settling [of ] America . . . have 
adopted the Indian customs and manners by indulging them in treaties and renewing 
friendships.61 
Captain Donald Campbell, the commander of the British stronghold Fort Detroit, further 
believed in a course of amiability and kindness when dealing with Native Americans.  Campbell 
supplied Native Americans near his fort with provisions such as ammunition, even though he 
was fearful of going against the wishes of Amherst. To his defense, Campbell did “what [he] 
thought was best for the service,” fearing a Native American uprising.62  
 The fear would materialize soon enough. In the summer of 1761, two Seneca—
Guyasuta, also known as Kiasuha, and Tahaiadoris—felt they were “ill treated” and called for a 
council among the neighboring nations for the purpose of planning a strike against all British 
garrisons.63  Angered by Amherst’s new policy, the Seneca leaders came to Detroit to distribute 
war belts to the Ottawas, Hurons, and Chippewas “to take up the hatchet” and to “cut off the 
English at Fort Detroit,” which would “give [them] the greatest joy and pleasure.”64  The war 
belts, made of wampum and painted red, were sent to tribes as a summons of war. On the 
contrary, a wampum belt painted white was given to an adversary to symbolize peace. The 
Senecas, with the help of Pontiac, delivered red war belts and also made speeches to try and 
motivate other tribes to join the cause.
 Not long after the Senecas were in the region, Native Americans from the Wyandot 
informed Campbell about their plan to attack his fort. Campbell told those members of the 
Wyandot who informed him to go to the Seneca council and report the news back to him. The 
Wyandot’s reported back about the Senecas’ well-constructed plan, triggered by Amherst’s new 
policies, but more importantly they discovered that the tribes planned to act as one.65  When 
Campbell learned of the plot, he called the local tribes into his own council and informed them 
he was conscious of their scheme against the English and that he, 
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Advise[d] [them] with all [his] heart in the most friendly manner, to return home and 
ardently recommend it to your chiefs and those of other nations in concert with you 
to quit their bad intentions and live in peace, for if they proceed in their designs again 
the English it will terminate in their utter ruin and destruction.66 
The conference ended with the Native Americans dispersing and Campbell convinced of 
the Senecas’ candor, but in actuality the Native Americans reasoned that since their plan was 
uncovered, they would wait patiently and allow the war belts to continue to circulate.67  Because 
of the vastness of the frontier, not all the war belts that the Seneca leaders had dispersed had 
reached their destination. Moreover, once a tribe had received the Seneca war belt, they could 
circulate it among other tribes that were in their region to get more warriors. 
 The Seneca plot had mixed reactions throughout the British ranks. Amherst reasoned 
that the uprising “never gave [him] momentous concern, as [he knew] of their incapacity of 
attempting anything serious.”68  General Henry Bouquet, who was the commander of Fort 
Pitt, one of the largest British forts, decided to not only bring British settlers who had been 
living on the frontier inside the fort, but also to form two companies of militia to strengthen 
the garrison. Although Bouquet took those precautions, he felt the entire Native American 
plot would fail and that they “could only flatter themselves to succeed by surprise.”69  Johnson, 
along with his deputy Croghan, however, did not take the plot lightly, and soon Johnson wrote 
a letter to Amherst in which he exclaimed “[he was] very apprehensive that something not right 
is brewing.”70  Johnson did not merely feel troubled over one tribe but all of the tribes. As the 
British continued to deal with the Seneca hysteria, a new prophet from among the Delaware 
was emerging, and presented new troubles for the crown.  
 This new prophet’s name was Neolin, who had supposedly fallen into a trance and 
visited the Master of Life, the supreme deity in Native American culture. During this trance, 
Neolin, or “Enlightened One,” came to three forks in the road, and after two were blocked, he 
faced the third, alongside a woman who instructed him to purify himself before meeting with 
the Master of Life.71  This part of Neolin’s trance symbolized for Native Americans a cleansing 
of themselves of their “white ways” through purification, or ridding themselves of the English.72 
After Neolin completed his purification process, he was able to listen to the Master of Life, who 
provided him with a set of orders to take back: 
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The land where ye dwell I have made for you and not for others. Whence comes it 
that ye permits the whites upon your land. Can ye not live without them? Ye could 
live as ye did before knowing them, before those whom ye call your brothers [the 
English] had come upon your lands. Did ye not live by the bow and arrow? Ye had 
no need for gun or power, or anything else. . . . As to those who trouble your lands, 
drive them out, make war upon them. I do not love them at all; they know me not, 
and are my enemies. . . . Send them back to the lands which I have created for them 
and let them stay there.73 
Neolin’s message served to further unify the diverse Native American people.  The Delawares, 
Shawnees and Mingoes, all from the Ohio Valley, and the Ottawas and Potawatomies from the 
Great Lakes all came to believe that the Master of Life was punishing them for allowing the 
British to come onto their land.74  Although Neolin denounced white practices, he really was 
preaching Native American guilt for embracing the practices; the great advantage of accepting 
guilt is that it restores power to the guilty party.75  The only way to change their fate was to 
actively rid themselves of the English.  
 While spending time away from his fort in Philadelphia, Bouquet, who left Captain 
Ecuyer to command Fort Pitt, was informed by Croghan that war belts were still spreading 
among Native Americans throughout the frontier. The Native Americans felt it was “time for 
them to prepare to defend themselves and their country from [the English].”76  When Amherst, 
who knew of the short supply of troops at the forts, heard of the activity on the frontier, he was 
surprisingly unworried. He felt the Native Americans’ “power [was] altogether insufficient,” 
and that they would not “attempt any mischief.”77  While Neolin was a key motivator for the 
Native Americans to take up arms against the British, Pontiac, leader of the Ottawa, was an 
even bigger problem for them. 
 Pontiac further used Neolin’s religious awakening and on April 27, 1763 called all the 
surrounding nations for a grand council to discuss an attack.78  Parkman admiringly stated that 
Pontiac, whose name was respected “from the sources of the Ohio to those of the Mississippi 
and to the farthest boundaries of the wide-spread Algonquin race,” was determined to launch 
a surprise attack against the British.79  A great orator, Pontiac called the grand council, which 
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consisted of the Potawatomies, Ottawas, Chippewas, and Hurons, to meet a short distance from 
Fort Detroit.80  There, Pontiac used the doctrine of the prophet Neolin and the Master of Life 
as a supernatural sanction for his conspiracy, and inspired the Native Americans to go to war.81 
Pontiac preached to the council who looked upon him as an “oracle” that the Master of Life 
had directed them to “drive off [their] lands those dogs clothed in red who will do nothing but 
harm.”82  In his speech, Pontiac urged them to take up arms and rid themselves of the British. 
The discourse by Pontiac and the fact that some Native Americans had received war belts two 
years prior to the council stimulated everyone because they were anxious and ready for war. 
The message was clear: Native Americans must not only purge themselves of English customs, 
but eradicate the foreigners from their land.        
 To have a greater chance of a victorious attack in Fort Detroit, Pontiac conceived of a 
plan that would allow both himself and his followers a better assessment of the fort. On May 1, 
1763, while Pontiac and fifty of his faithful Ottawas approached Fort Detroit and were admitted 
to perform a ceremonial dance for the commander of the fort, Major Henry Gladwin, a few 
snuck off once inside and looked around to locate the British’s barracks and defenses.83  Gladwin 
and his soldiers were not worried about Native Americans sneaking around prior to this event, 
for they had always been restless but never deceptive.84  When the ceremony came to an end, 
Gladwin did not suspect anything to be astray, and Pontiac informed the British that he would 
return again in a couple of days so that more of his tribe could meet the commander.  
 Once back in their village, the Ottawas prepared for the attack. Pontiac held a council 
meeting at the Potawatomi village on May 5 and exclaimed passionately to them: 
It is important for us, my brothers, that we exterminate from our lands [the English 
who seek] only to destroy us. . . . When I go to see the English commander and say 
to him that some of our comrades are dead, instead of bewailing their death. . . . He 
laughs at me and at you. . . . Therefore, my brothers, we must all swear their destruction 
and wait no longer.85 
At the council it was decided that on May 7, Pontiac and sixty warriors with tomahawks and 
other weapons hidden under their blankets would enter the fort while their women would enter 
with muskets under their clothing.86  Pontiac would use a wampum belt to signal the attack 
inside the fort while the other Potawatomies, outside the fort, would attack any English with 
whom they came in contact.87  Although Pontiac employed a wampum belt in a new and creative 
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way, using the belt as a weapon rather than for the more traditional purpose of a summons of 
war, his plan would end up being spoiled regardless.  
 Although Pontiac’s plan was well organized, Gladwin and his troops were soon informed 
by several Ottawa Indians who were reluctant to fight. At this, the English began to frantically 
prepare the fort for an attack. On May 7, Pontiac and his warriors returned to the fort and 
were startled by the sight of the whole garrison at arms. Pontiac said to Gladwin, “We would be 
very glad to know the reason for this, for we imagine some bird has given thee ill news of us.”88 
Rightfully chagrined and bewildered that their plan had been uncovered, Pontiac assured the 
soldiers of the misunderstanding and told the British that he would return once again to smoke 
the peace pipe.89  Now well aware of the Native Americans’ plot, Gladwin and his troops had 
more time to prepare and to welcome in any families living outside of the fortification’s walls. 
When Pontiac and his warriors arrived back on May 9, the guard at the front of the gate was 
ordered to only let Pontiac and a couple of his leading men in. Pontiac, taking this as a sign of 
disrespect because all the Native Americans wanted to be involved in the ceremony, told the 
guard to tell Gladwin “that he may stay in his fort, and that I will keep the country.”90  Pontiac 
and his warriors returned to their village, picked up their hatchets and tomahawks and charged 
at Fort Detroit. With that, the siege of Fort Detroit had begun. 
 Chanting their war song, Pontiac and his willing warriors killed twenty-four head 
of cattle and even British Sergeant Fisher and his family on the way to Fort Detroit.91  Once 
arriving at the fort, Pontiac ordered the Ottawas to watch the north side of the fort to prevent 
anyone from entering, while the rest of the warriors tried to hide themselves as firing began 
from the British. Pontiac, low on supplies, arranged for a peace talk during the cease-fire, 
and sent envoys to the garrison with the hopes of truce. The British, with a lack of provisions 
themselves, entertained the idea and sent Captain Campbell, accompanied by Lieutenant George 
McDougall, to converse with the Native Americans because not only would it take months to 
get word to Amherst for supplies, but even if the supplies did come they would be confiscated 
by Pontiac.92   
 The two British officers apprehensively walked with Pontiac to the house of Antoine 
Cuillerier, a Frenchman involved in the rebellion.93  Pontiac told them that if the British 
abandoned Fort Detroit and their provisions, they would be allowed to march to Fort Niagara. 
The officers asserted that they would have to bring the proposal back to Gladwin, but just as they 
were about to depart, Pontiac seized them both and unexpectedly made them hostages.94  The 
translator of the confrontation, Pierre LaButte, went back and informed Gladwin of Pontiac’s 
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terms and of the capture of two of his officers, but the commander would not negotiate while 
his officers were held prisoner.95  The siege continued after the two sides failed to reach an 
agreement. The siege eventually ended in a stalemate in October, six months after it began, but 
not before British captives were taken and eventually killed. The attack on Detroit brought the 
British’s worst fear to life, but it was only the beginning of the brutal violence that would ensue. 
 The first British fort to fall was Fort Sandusky. Stationed along Lake Erie in Ohio, 
this was a crucial fort to attack because it was on the vital trail of communication between Fort 
Detroit and Fort Pitt.  The commander of the fort, Ensign Christopher Pauli, was on peaceful 
terms with nearby Wyandots. After being encouraged by Ottawas and Wyandots already involved 
in Pontiac’s plan, the nearby Wyandots acquiesced to join in the war and on May 16 went to 
Fort Sandusky and requested to speak with Pauli.96  Pauli, unsuspecting of trouble, allowed 
them to enter and they quickly scattered around the fort emitting war cries as they slaughtered 
and scalped the troops, fifteen in all.97  Having achieved their goal, the Wyandots then burned 
the garrison, and spared Pauli, whom they took with them as a prisoner.98  The Wyandots and 
Ottawas suffered no casualties in this victory at Sandusky and it helped motivate other Native 
Americans to join the fight.99  
 The next British fort to be attacked fell in a very similar fashion to that of Ft. Sandusky. 
Located in southern Michigan, Fort St. Joseph, commanded by Ensign Francis Schlosser, was 
greeted on the morning of May 25 with a small group of Potawatomies who wanted to introduce 
their relatives to the commander.100  The commander consented, and when the Potawatomies left 
to get their relatives, Schlosser was warned by a French resident of a possible attack.101  By the 
time Schlosser rushed back to his barracks to warn his undersized regiment of men, he found the 
garrison swarming with Native Americans. Before Schlosser had time to arm himself, a war cry 
was heard, and within two minutes the Potawatomies killed everyone except Schlosser and two 
others. The Native Americans were deceptive in their attacks not only because they wanted to 
outmaneuver their adversary, but because they felt their actions were justifiable since they were 
being cheated by Britain’s new policy in regard to the allocation of gifts. An alarming pattern 
of treachery was developing, one to which the British were not accustomed. 
 The pattern of duplicity continued with the attack on Fort Miami. Commanded by 
Ensign Robert Holmes, its location was strategic: the intersection of the St. Mary and St. Joseph 
Rivers in northeastern Indiana, which was the direct route between Canada and Louisiana.102 
When he was warned of cannon fire coming from the direction of Detroit, unlike most British 
officers who ignored rumors, Holmes put his small company of men on guard and prepared 
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for an attack. Yet Holmes, who was an experienced frontier officer, had foolishly taken a Native 
American mistress.  When a Native American from the Miami village was sick, Holmes’s 
mistress convinced him to assist, and no sooner than he arrived at the village he was killed by 
a member of the Miami tribe. The remaining soldiers at Fort Miami naturally shut their gates 
in worry. Two French messengers Jacques Godfroy and Mini Chene, acting on behalf of the 
Native Americans, approached the fort and convinced the British to surrender, but not before 
looting the fort and killing four of the eleven soldiers that were left.103  The deception of the 
Native Americans had deepened, and this time it involved a woman.
 Located along the Wabash River in southwestern Indiana, the fourth British fort to fall 
by duplicity was Fort Ouiatenon, commanded by Lieutenant Edward Jenkins. Jenkins, much 
like Pauli at Sandusky, was on very good terms with local tribes. However, the Ottawa told the 
Weas, Kickapoos, and Mascoutens about their past victories and influenced them to join in 
the attack.104  The lieutenant was not aware of the Native Americans’ past victories, and when 
the local tribes asked him to meet for a council, Jenkins had no suspicions of an attack. When 
Jenkins appeared at the council he was immediately seized, and his whole feeble garrison soon 
surrendered but not before the local tribes who subdued them asserted that they were “sorry, 
but that they were obliged to do it by the other nations.”105  Although the fourth British fort 
to fall, the Native Americans had yet to take a major garrison; but that was about to change. 
 The first major fort the Native Americans victoriously attacked turned out to be 
the bloodiest.106  Fort Michilimackinac, a major fur-trading center in northern Michigan, 
commanded by Captain George Etherington consisted of over forty men and was one of the 
larger garrisons the British possessed.107  Stubborn to a fault, when a French resident warned 
Etherington about Native American activity in the area, he ignored the caution and “threatened 
to send the next person who should bring a story of the same kind a prisoner to Detroit.”108  A 
few days later on June 2, numerous Chippewa and Sauk congregated outside the Etherington’s 
fort to engage in a game of lacrosse.109  The fort was not on alert, so British officers and soldiers 
alike went outside of the fortification to watch the game. As the game went on, Native Americans 
purposely tossed the ball inside the fort, and as they rushed in to retrieve it, they were handed 
weapons that were hidden under the blankets of their women, and opened fired on the helpless 
garrison.110  When the fighting ended, twenty-one British soldiers had been killed, while others, 
including Etherington, were held hostage.111  
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 The Native Americans spared Etherington and his soldiers’ lives, but not before the 
commander promised more captives. Etherington wrote a letter to Lieutenant James Gorrell, the 
commander of Fort Edward Augustus, ordering their small garrison to join him and his men.112 
If the Native Americans could take one of the British’s larger forts in Fort Michilimackinac, 
he knew Gorrell’s garrison would be no match for them. On the same day as the attack on 
Etherington’s fort, Fort Ligonier, commanded by Lieutenant Archibald Blane, purposely set fire 
to some of its structures rather than surrender it to the Native Americans. Fort Edward Augustus 
and Ligonier, not as vital or as large as Michilimackinac, likewise fell to the Native Americans 
without much of a struggle. The triumphant attack on Etherington’s fort was a key victory for 
the Native Americans. By taking one of the larger British forts, it raised not only the Native 
Americans’ confidence and persuaded more tribes to join the attack, but it demonstrated to the 
British how severe this insurgence truly was.   
 Positioned in western Pennsylvania, Fort Venango was commanded by Lieutenant 
Francis Gordon and fifteen Royal Americans. The fort fell on June 16 to the Senecas through 
the same deceptive circumstances as Michilimackinac: a game of lacrosse.113  Once the Senecas 
rushed inside, with the help of the Mingoes, they slaughtered every soldier except Gordon. 
Instead of killing Gordon on the spot, they forced him to write down their grievances to the 
crown: 
the scarcity and dearness of [gun] powder for these two years past. . . . [and] the 
English keeping so many posts in their country [which] gave them reason to think 
that [the English] were determined to posses their country, therefore we would destroy 
[the English].114
After the letter was written, the Senecas burned not only the fort, but Gordon too.  The Senecas 
then sent the correspondence with a party of warriors who were traveling to Fort Pitt, and were 
told to drop the letter on the way with the intentions that the English would find it and raise 
tensions along the frontier.115  Although the purpose behind the letter was to justify to the British 
their reasoning for the attacks, it was fortunate that the letter was found by a British officer and 
not lost in the vastness of the frontier.
 The Mingoes and Senecas then moved north to attack Fort LeBeouf. The western 
Pennsylvania fort, commanded by Ensign George Price, had a small squadron of thirteen 
other soldiers on guard when they were warned by other British officers at Fort Presque Isle 
that Native Americans had attacked Fort Detroit.116   The Native Americans appeared at Price’s 
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fort on July 18, and after being turned away twice by the British upon asking for provisions 
assuming they were insincere, attacked. Aided by the Delawares, the three tribes added to their 
gunfire by shooting flaming arrows at the fort’s structures.117  As fire spread, the soldiers wanted 
to evacuate the fort, but were compelled to stay by Price who exclaimed, “We must fight as 
long as we can, and then die together.”118  If they were going to die, however, it would not be 
fighting the Native Americans, because before long, Price gave in to his soldiers’ demand and 
ordered a retreat. The ninth British fort had fallen.   
 The Native Americans then concentrated their manpower to Fort Presque Isle, one of 
the larger British garrisons with twenty-nine men located in Erie, Pennsylvania; it was a another 
crucial link on the communication trail between Forts Detroit and Pitt.119  Commandeered by 
Ensign John Christie, whom Amherst praised for “being prepared for the defense of his post,” 
soon made Amherst regret his cordial words.120  On the morning of July 20, the soldiers awoke 
to find that nearly two hundred and fifty Native American warriors from four nations had 
strategically set themselves upon two hills overlooking the garrison.121  Like the attack at Fort 
LeBeouf, these Native Americans once again used flaming arrows to subdue the fort. After two 
days of fighting and a continual bombardment of flaming arrows, which Christie later called a 
“smart” strategy, the Native Americans broke through the fort’s gates and set fire to the officers’ 
quarters.122  Convinced he was outflanked and that the Native Americans would only take the 
garrison and not harm his soldiers, Christie surrendered. Rather than live up to their words, the 
Native Americans divided the soldiers into groups for each tribe to take as their captives. Amherst 
would later write “It is amazing that [Christie] could put so much faith in the promises of the 
Indians.”123  Christie was not alone in both trusting the Native Americans and not thinking 
anything was amiss. With the exception of Fort Presque Isle in which they used sheer force, the 
Native Americans used deception in every other fort attack. The tenth British fort had fallen, 
and there was no sign of the Native Americans slowing their attacks. 
 Throughout late May and June, the soldiers at Fort Pitt under the command of Captain 
Ecuyer were informed of the destruction on the frontier. William Trent, an Indian trader and 
Indian agent before taking up the commanding job of the militia at Pitt, wrote down the day 
to day details of living at the fort. Trent’s rationale for keeping a journal at Fort Pitt was to 
encompass everything from the daily activities of the fort to first-hand accounts from others 
about the annihilation on the frontier by Native Americans.124  Bias in his journal, if any, can 
be seen in the latter, which contains an overwhelming cultural fear of Native Americans and 
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misconstrued information due to the poor communication of frontier life. Nonetheless, Trent’s 
journal not only gives the most detailed accounts available of life in Fort Pitt during the siege 
of 1763, but also highlights the succession of brutality leading up to Captain Ecuyer’s famous 
decision regarding the smallpox-infested blankets.   
 Similar to the siege of other forts, Native American attacks were prevalent around the 
outlying regions of Fort Pitt in early June. Trent wrote on May 29 about both the death of Colonel 
William Clapham at his home and of two soldiers who were at the sawmill.125  Emotions at Fort 
Pitt were heightened by this news because Clapham’s homestead, along with the sawmill, were 
a mere twenty-five miles from their fort.126  Ecuyer, convinced that a Native American uprising 
was certain, dispatched riders to Philadelphia to inform Bouquet that he thought “the [Native 
American] uprising [was] general [and] that he tremble[d] for [his] post.”127  Well aware of the 
Native Americans’ hostile actions and close proximity to his fort, Ecuyer began to prepare for 
an attack.  
 The day after Ecuyer dispatched the letter to Bouquet, Trent’s journal illustrated more 
ambushes and attacks on British settlers living on the frontier that were within the vicinity of 
Fort Pitt. On May 30, 1763, Trent writes of Thomas Calhoun, a profitable trader at the time, 
who had arrived at Fort Pitt from the village of Tuscarawas with crucial news. Calhoun was 
instructed by Delaware Chiefs on the May 27 to leave his trading post with his men on the 
Tuscarawas, because they did not want to see him killed.128  As Calhoun and his men made 
their way to Fort Pitt, Trent describes how they were fired upon by Native Americans, which 
killed all but Calhoun and two others. After telling of his heroic escape to the fort, he further 
explained to Captain Ecuyer that the Delaware Chiefs also told him that, “Detroit was taken, 
the post at Sandusky burnt and all the garrison put to death, except the officer who they made 
prisoner.”129   
 Aside from Fort LeBeouf, Fort Pitt is unique in that it received firsthand accounts of 
the destruction of other forts, which undoubtedly prepared them for an attack. Even though 
Trent’s account depicts a Native American victory at Fort Detroit, in actuality the fort did not 
fall, but as already stated, was stalemated. Still, Ecuyer had no other eyewitness accounts by which 
to act and truly believed that Fort Detroit, same in size and stature as Pitt, had fallen. While 
this alarmed him, so too did the surrendering of Fort Sandusky, which showed that the Native 
Americans were not just attacking major forts. Within Trent’s brief account from Calhoun, he 
rendered Ecuyer and the British army’s fear of a Native American uprising a reality.
 Within a week, on June 7, Trent described an account by Lieutenant Abraham Cuyler 
that told of “Lieut. Schlossers Post [being] destroyed.”130  Cuyler was on a vessel with 139 barrels 
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of provisions en route to Fort Detroit when he was attacked by Native Americans. He then made 
his retreat to Fort Sandusky, which was already destroyed, and on to Fort Presque Isle where he 
learned of the Native Americans’ victory at Schlosser’s Fort St. Joseph.131  When William Trent 
and Captain Ecuyer heard news from John Calhoun and Lieutenant Cuyler of the destruction 
of their British forts, they tightened up their patrols with the thought that their time would 
soon come to defend Fort Pitt. The Native Americans periodically attempted to draw Ecuyer’s 
soldiers out of their fort by setting fire to structures surrounding it, but the commander knew 
of their past deception and later wrote to Bouquet “[Native Americans] would like to decoy 
me and make me send out detachments, but they will not fool me.”132  Even though Fort Pitt 
was the largest and most expensive of the western forts, Fort Detroit, which they thought had 
been taken, was the largest post of the Upper Great Lakes.133  Upon taking Sandusky and 
then St. Joseph, Ecuyer thought that Native Americans had taken three major forts in a row, 
understandably concluding that this strengthened not only the latter’s confidence in their own 
skills, but had also given them “expansive ideas” of further attacks.134  
 On June 22, Native Americans, made mostly of Delawares, attacked Fort Pitt in 
hopes of continuing their victorious streak. Trent wrote in his journal that a “great number of 
Indians appeared on each river and on Grant’s Hill” and began firing on the fort.135  The firing 
lessened when Ecuyer ordered an explosive shell be thrown at the Native Americans, but the 
latter soon recovered as the night drew on. On June 4, a week after Ecuyer sent his dispatches, 
due in part to the vastness of the conflict ridden frontier, they were received by Bouquet who 
then sent them to Amherst in New York. Amherst felt “this alarm will end in nothing more 
than a rash attempt of what the Senecas have been threatening and which we have heard of for 
some time past.”136   Still, he assembled two light infantry regiments to hold in Staten Island. 
Within five days of sending troops to Staten Island, Amherst abruptly ordered them to march 
to Philadelphia to aid Bouquet. This was because Amherst had received word of Pontiac’s 
actions to the west and wrote “I find the affairs of the Indians, appears to be more general that 
I had apprehended.”137   Amherst’s immediate deployment of troops displays the urgency he 
must have felt for his forts. Throughout most of his dealings with Sir William Johnson, he was 
always careful with his provisions as well as his short supply of men. Although Amherst took 
the initiative to send troops to Bouquet, ten British forts had already fallen, with an attack on 
Fort Pitt in motion.
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 According to Trent, two chiefs, Turtle’s Heart and Maumaultee, came before the fort 
for a truce on June 24 and announced that “all [British] _____ as Ligonier was destroyed.”138 
Although the information in Trent’s journal for this entry is misconstrued and missing a crucial 
word, one could read it as, “All British forts as far as Ligonier was destroyed.” Native Americans 
spread word of their victories at forts to other tribes and regions with the hopes of drawing them 
in. Therefore, it is very likely that Turtle’s Heart and Maumaultee knew of past British forts 
falling.  Although Trent’s journal, up to that entry, was written in a very concise and decipherable 
style, he wrote on June 24 that he was in the midst of a battle, and hence he was doubtlessly 
more worried about the fort’s well being than the clarity of his journal. Nonetheless, even if the 
excerpt from Trent’s journal only meant Fort Ligioner had fallen, then the British would still 
be troubled to think another British fort fell, making their own total at four.  
 The two chiefs, representing six nations, told Ecuyer several nations were ready to 
attack but were going to give the fort time to surrender and retreat.139  Ecuyer thanked them 
but declined, and the chiefs told the fort that they would return after conversing with the other 
nations. As commander of Fort Pitt, Ecuyer knew he had to ward off the Native Americans and 
defend his garrison. With the assumption that Detroit had fallen, Pitt was the last major British 
stronghold the Natives had not taken. When the chiefs came back a second time to inform the 
commander they were going to hold their position, they requested some provisions for their 
journey home. Ecuyer, who was well aware of Native American deception, thought they only 
wanted the provisions in order to enter his fort and attack. The Native Americans had already 
attempted to draw the commander and his soldiers out of Fort Pitt, and they could easily be 
attempting to use the same setup again. Ecuyer decided to provide the chiefs with some rations, 
but among the supplies he deceptively gave them the infamously deadly gift: smallpox. While 
the two chiefs may have been suspicious that the British distributed gifts to them, they may 
have also thought the British finally capitulated, and realized that they could not win the war. 
Trent’s words confirm without a doubt Britain’s non-capitulating offensive strategy: “Out of 
our regard to [the chiefs] we gave them two blankets and a handkerchief out of the smallpox 
hospital. I hope it has the desired effect.”140   
 Trent and Ecuyer used this aggressive approach because they were well aware of the 
trickery that Native Americans used to besiege prior forts. That “desired effect” was to infect 
those two Native American chiefs with smallpox. The chiefs, then, would spread it amongst 
their tribe. When the two chiefs came to talk during the parley, Ecuyer did not know what 
their true intentions were. Ecuyer was conscious of the deception used at the prior forts where, 
for example, Native Americans guided British officers back to their camp under the guise of 
hospitality and then captured them. Aside from the craftiness Native Americans used, Ecuyer 
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also knew of their manpower and the lack of the British’s around the frontier. Due in part to 
the majority of Britain’s army being deployed after the French and Indian War to other places, 
and the scattered placement of British forts around the extensive frontier, the ‘powerful’ British 
army was spread so thin they could not maintain suitable garrisons. Along with Fort Detroit, if 
Fort Pitt had fallen, two of the largest British forts on the frontier would have been in the hands 
of Native Americans. If Fort Detroit, one of the largest forts in the country at that time was 
surrendered, Fort Pitt had just as much of a chance of seizure. To Captain Ecuyer, the Native 
Americans had just taken four major forts from the British, and were coming for Fort Pitt next 
with the strength of not only manpower but of motivation behind them. He was confident of 
the ability and morale of his men, but did not want to risk surrendering his fort. The Native 
Americans’ underhanded victories at the previous forts thus compelled the disheartened British 
to employ germ warfare among them with the hope that it would stop their attack on Fort 
Pitt.
 Even though there has been much discussion about Amherst and the infamous gifts, 
Captain Ecuyer and the other officers at Fort Pitt should be the ones to receive the credit for the 
idea.141  Ecuyer had already distributed the blankets when Amherst wrote to Bouquet on July 
7, 1763 and stressed that “every commanding officer [should] never trust [Native American] 
promises,” and then questioned “could it not be contrived to send the smallpox among the 
disaffected tribes of Indians?”142  Amherst’s letter to Bouquet belittled any notion that Ecuyer 
and his officers at Fort Pitt gave the blankets to the Native Americans with sincere kindness; 
on the contrary, it was out of distrust. This declaration of mistrusting promises grew out of 
Amherst’s knowledge of his fallen forts to the deceptive Native Americans. The conditions of 
the frontier meant that Amherst was always notified late of the Native American conflicts, 
while Ecuyer was informed of the destruction on the frontier daily as described through Trent’s 
journal.143   Ecuyer knew he could not await Amherst’s orders, and on June 24, acted on his 
own when Turtle’s Heart and Maumaultee came to his fort.          
 Although the British were commanded by Ecuyer, they may have been influenced to 
distribute the smallpox blankets by William Trent himself. Among the records of William Trent’s 
trading firm’s account against the crown it reads “The sundries to replace in kind those which were 
taken from people in the hospital to convey the small-pox to the Indians.”144   Recent scholars 
credit Trent for the infamous idea because not only was Ecuyer an inexperienced commander, 
but because he was furious that his trading industry was declining partly because of the Native 
Americans’ unrest.145   Trent was even further enraged when Native Americans stole ten horses 
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that personally belonged to him.146  Not only were the Native Americans killing his customers, 
but they were making families living on the frontier disperse to other places. Even though Trent 
was an experienced soldier, his military skills were not highly regarded. Nevertheless, Ecuyer 
leaned heavily on Trent, who had spent much time on the frontier among Native Americans.147 
Still, even if Trent had come up with the plan because he had a personal vendetta against the 
Native Americans, Ecuyer was still in charge of the fort and was consulted on all matters. Ecuyer 
would not jeopardize his career as a British officer simply to satisfy the vengeance feelings Trent 
had towards the Native Americans. Although Trent was concerned with his declining financial 
stability, his duties as a soldier came first and was enraged that the Native Americans took ten 
British forts practically unopposed.  Ecuyer ordered the blankets as an aggressive approach to 
halt the Native Americans victories, not to please Trent. 
  Although it was first believed that the blankets were successful in killing many Native 
Americans, recent studies belittle the blankets’ effects. In 1851, when Parkman’s book was 
published, he stated that the blankets “made havoc among the tribes.”148    A reexamination of 
the incident, however, indicated that the British experiment in germ warfare may well have been 
a failure. Although the blanket incident was Britain’s first trial with germ warfare, the Native 
Americas attempted their own experiment in 1761 by trying to poison a well at Fort Ligonier 
“in hopes to hurt ye people.”149  The British, much like the Native Americans in 1761, would 
come up short of their desired effect. In March 1765, a Delaware chief told William Johnson 
that “the Shawanes lost in three months time a hundred and forty nine men besides women and 
children by sickness above a year ago, also many of them dyed last summer of the smallpox.”150 
This account indicates that the epidemic took hold sometime later than June 1763, when the 
blankets were distributed to the Native Americans. Moreover, another eyewitness account in 
1764 stated that “the smallpox has been very general and raging amongst the Indians since last 
spring” and has killed many Mingoes, Delawares and Shawneese.151  This statement, on the 
other hand, indicated that the epidemic began before June 1763, long before Ecuyer presented 
the infected blankets. Perhaps the most crucial piece of evidence that belittles the effects of the 
smallpox blankets was the return of Turtle’s Heart and Maumaultee, the chiefs who received 
the blankets, to Fort Pitt a full month later. While it is plausible that both chiefs were already 
immune to the disease, it is more likely that the plot failed. Had the scheme succeeded, the 
“Indians vesting the fort would have been reeling from the plague.”152  If the Native Americans 
had contracted the disease they would have certainly abandoned their disease-infested location 
surrounding Fort Pitt and moved to a healthier area. In contrast, the Native Americans continued 
with the siege through the end of July.  
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 The siege at Fort Pitt would come to an end not because of smallpox, but due to the 
advancing British forces led by Bouquet, who would eventually turn the tide of the war.  When 
the Native Americans encountered the British Army led by Bouquet, the Battle of Bushy Run 
would commence. After the British fought to victory, they moved on and later relieved Fort 
Pitt on August 20. Even though the Native Americans retaliated a month later when they killed 
seventy-two British soldiers by Fort Niagara, after 1763, major combat in Pontiac’s War was 
effectively over. In 1763 Amherst was recalled back to London, and replaced by General Thomas 
Gage, who was more willing to listen to Johnson in regard to Native American policy. The 
Native Americans, lacking ammuntion and realizing they could not wipe out the British, were 
ready to negotiate. Upon signing the Treaty of Fort Niagara in 1764, and securing peace with 
the Seneca, Wyandot, Ojibwas and others, the British conducted two military operations that 
concluded in 1765, to further obtain peace from those Native Americans who were unwilling 
to negoaite.153   George Croghan, Johnson’s deputy, was sent in 1765 to the Illinois Country to 
persuade Pontiac to accompany him to New York where he could sign an official treaty of Peace 
with Johnson. The British knew no lasting peace treaty was possible without his approval; on 
July 25, 1766, a formal treaty was signed thus ending the rebellion.154  Although no lands were 
ceded and no prisoners were returned, it was the “first major multi-tribal war against European 
invaders that ended in accommodation, rather than complete Amerindian defeat.”155  
 While there was tension with Native Americans prior to the French and Indian War, 
tensions only intensified after the victor, Britain, reconfigured a new policy. Before and during 
the war the French treated the Native Americans as equals. They established a long standing 
economy with and even lived among them. The gifts of good fruits and diplomacy the French 
presented to the various chiefs had additional meaning.  When a chief went back to his tribe 
with the presents he had received, it reassured the tribe of their chief ’s power and authority. 
When the British applied new policy changes, specifically reducing the distribution of gifts 
and armory, chiefs were the first ones to worry. The chiefs knew they would lose power among 
their own people by being unable to bring back those two valuable necessities to their tribes. 
In general, the British’s policy changes were foreign and offensive to the Native Americans 
who had followed French guidelines for years. To the British, their new ‘subjects’ were an 
impediment to their expansion, and a drain on their economy; the Native Americans could 
not live harmoniously because British rule by definition meant domination. When the Native 
Americans unsuspectingly revolted, the British were not only caught off guard, but bewildered 
to learn that their newly acquired ‘subjects,’ now adversaries, were so organized and deceptive 
in their attacks. 
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 Within three months of the British imposing their new policies, which reduced the 
status of Native Americans from allies to their new ‘subjects,’ Native Americans realized that 
they would have to rise up to regain what they originally had. In only two months, the Native 
Americans had not only made the British army’s fear a reality, but they created a new fear that 
their treachery and man power might even be able to overtake them. These new policies were 
centered around the needs of the British and did not consider the needs of their new ‘subjects.’ 
Native Americans now had to adjust to not receiving the guns and ammunitions to which 
they had been accustomed. In turn, their chiefs suffered from losing the prestige they once 
encompassed within their tribes. By taking ten British forts, Native Americans thus reasserted 
their claim to their own land and were truly “masters of their country.”156   Their victories, 
nevertheless, would stop short of their goal: as the British purged the land of them, the tide 
of the rebellion would turn.  By taking the land and its inhabitants who had lived there for 
thousands of years, the British imposed an incontestable policy of domination in which Native 
Americans were an impediment to British rule and needed to be eliminated. 
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